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The Regional Dimension of Collective Wage Bargaining: 
The Case of Belgium 
 
The potential failure of national industry agreements to take into account productivity levels of 
least productive regions has been considered as one of the causes of regional 
unemployment in European countries. Two solutions are generally proposed: the first, 
encouraged by the European commission and the OECD, consists in decentralising wage 
bargaining to the firm. The second solution, the regionalisation of wage bargaining, is 
frequently mentioned in Belgium or in Italy where regional unemployment differentials are 
high. The objective of this paper is to verify if the Belgian wage setting system, where 
industry bargaining has a national scope, indeed prevents regional productivity levels to be 
taken into account in wage formation. Using a very rich linked employer-employee dataset 
which provides detailed information on wages, productivity, and worker’s and firm’s 
characteristics, we find that regional wage differentials and regional productivity differentials 
within joint committees
2 are positively correlated. Moreover, this relation is stronger (i) for 
joint committees where firm-level bargaining is relatively frequent and (ii) for joint committees 
already sub-divided along a local line. We conclude that the current Belgian wage setting 
system (which combines interprofessional, industry and firm level bargaining) already 
includes mechanisms that allow regional productivity to be taken into account. 
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2 Joint Committees are permanent bodies at the industry level in which employers' associations and 
trade unions are represented. Their main task is to oversee the conclusion of industry collective 




Within the framework of the debate over the relationship between the structure of wage 
bargaining and economic performances in Europe, the question concerning the regional 
dimension returns in a recurring way. The discussion often relates, in particular, to the 
capacity of wage-setting systems to take into account the important economic disparities 
between regions. Pench  et al. (1999) support for example that a uniform fixation of 
wages across regions would not be adapted to local job markets. According to Davies and 
Hallet (2001), the important regional differences in unemployment observed in numerous 
European countries are due to the incapacity of the wage-setting systems to take into 
account the levels of productivity of the least productive regions.
3 The predominance of 
national industry bargaining, in a large number of European countries, could explain this 
phenomenon. Accordingly, two types of answers are generally proposed in order to take 
into account the local environment in the establishment of wages. The first, supported by 
the European Commission (Davies and Hallet, 2001)   and  the  OECD  (OECD, 
2006), consists of decentralising wage bargaining towards the company level. The 
second, which appears regularly in Belgium and in Italy
4, two countries characterised by 
important regional differences in unemployment, consists of regionalising wage 
bargaining.  
Within European countries, only Spain and Germany present a regionalised formation of 
wages. In Spain, Simón et al. (2006) note important variations in wages between regions 
as well as in wages agreed at the industry level as in actual paid wages. They deduce 
from this that the regional character of industry bargaining allows for a differentiation of 
wages between regions. However, these wage differences do not seem to fully reflect 
local conditions because of the phenomenon of inter-regional imitation within one same 
industry (Bande et al., 2008). In the case of Germany the regional differences in industry 
 
3 Other factors such as the differences in economic development, labour qualification and the lack of 
geographic mobility can also causes differences in unemployment between regions. (Davies et Hallet, 
2001) 
4 For Italy, see EIRO (1998). 3 
 
                                                           
agreed wages are rather weak although wage bargaining is held at the Landers level. The 
strongly coordinated character of wage bargaining between trade-union confederations 
and employer associations could explain this situation (Schnabel, 1999). In the countries 
where industry bargaining is not regionalised, the regional differences in wages vary 
significantly. In Italy, the important regional differences in unemployment do not seem to 
generate large wage disparities. For Dell'aringa and Pagani (2005), this can be explained 
by the existence of wages floor generated by industry agreements which would prevent 
wages from adapting themselves in the regions of low levels of productivity. The Italian 
example cannot, however, be carried over to all the countries without regionalised 
industry bargaining. Indeed, the level of regional wage differentials depends also in the 
degree of centralisation/coordination of wage bargaining. Vamvakidis (2008) analyses 
the relation between the degree of coordination of wage bargaining and the regional wage 
differentials
5 in 10 European countries between 1980 and 2000. His results indicate a 
negative relation between the degree of coordination of wage bargaining and the level of 
regional wage differentials.
6 To sum up, the organisation of the formation of wages at the 
regional level appears not to be a sufficient condition, neither a necessary condition, for 
generating high levels of regional wage differences. It seems in fact, in this debate, that 
the regional character of the wage-setting systems  brings less than the degree of 
centralisation/coordination of wage bargaining. 
In Belgium, the regionalisation of wage bargaining is at the heart of current negotiations 
relative to a de-federalisation of employment policy. The partisans for the regionalisation 
of wage bargaining
7 argue that the differences in productivity between regions cannot be 
reflected in a formation of wages at the federal level. They add that a negotiation at the 
Walloon level would be more sensitive to unemployment and would thus involve lower 
wages for this region.  
 
5 Expressed by the OECD index taking into account the level of bargaining and the formal or informal 
coordination between trade unions and employers. 
6 Quiet logically, these results are only relevant for the countries characterized by strong differences in 
regional levels of productivity.  
7 Notably the Flemish christian democratic party (CDNV-NVA) and the Flemish liberal party (VLD). 4 
 
The present paper discusses the pertinence of a regionalisation of wage bargaining in 
Belgium in verifying, in an empirical manner, whether the actual wage-setting system 
(inter-professional agreement, followed by industry agreements, and eventually followed 
by firm-level agreements) is flexible enough to take into account the regional differences 
in productivity in the formation of wages. 
A way of evaluating the pertinence of the regionalisation of wages in Belgium is to 
analyse its potential consequences. Bogaert (2008) supports for example that a 
regionalisation of wages would remove the moderating influence of “francophone” 
unemployment on Flemish wages. As an effect this would increase wages in Flanders 
and, through demonstration, would generate similar wage increases in Wallonia. The 
final result would be a higher increase of wages than in the current federal system. This 
phenomenon seems to be occurring in Spain where bargaining are already regionalized 
(Bande  et al., 2008). Deschamps (2003) suggests that a regionalisation of wage 
bargaining would also increase the complexity of the system and would lead to 
administrative costs for firms that have production sites in more than one region. 
Deschamps (2003) also argues that a regionalisation of wages would pave the way to the 
regionalisation of social security. It would be indeed incoherent to restrict regionalisation 
solely on wages, and not on total labour costs. Therefore, the contributions to social 
security, which represents a large part of the total labour costs, would also be 
regionalised. This  could, finally, affect the level of social security spending in the 
different regions. 
Another way of assessing the relevance of the regionalisation of wages would be to 
discuss the argument that the current system of wage formation is incapable of taking into 
account the different regional levels of productivity. This approach has the advantage of 
being tested empirically. Several recent studies have tried to answer this question 
(Dejemeppe and Van der Linden, 2006; Plasman et al., 2007; Joskin et al., 2008). Their 
results seem to indicate that the average labour productivity is lower in Wallonia 
(Dejemeppe and Van der Linden, 2006; Joskin et al., 2008) but, in the same time, there 
already exists wage differences between regions (Dejemeppe and Van der Linden, 2006; 
Plasman et al., 2007). 5 
 
                                                           
These wage differences, nonetheless, only take partially into account the differences in 
productivity. Indeed, according to Dejemeppe and Van der Linden (2006) and Joskin et 
al. (2008), the unit labour cost is, in average
8 higher in Wallonia than in the rest of the 
country. The data used in this last analysis suffer nonetheless from two limitations: 
Firstly, they are macro-level data so they do not allow taking into account eventual 
composition effects. Secondly, they do not distinguish between salaried workers and self-
employed workers whose revenues are not determined by collective bargaining. 
Based on these empirical results, one can legitimately ask how the current system could 
take into account the regional differences in productivity. The possibility to complete the 
national industry agreements by agreements at the firm level could be the explanation 
(Dejemeppe and Van der Linder, 2006; Plasman et al., 2007). Verly (2003) estimates 
that, in Belgium, approximately half of the employees is affected by a wage bargaining 
process on a level other than the national. On one hand, several joint committees are 
subdivided into sub-joint committees at the regional level. These joint committees cover 
nearly 16 % of employees in the private sector.
9 On the other hand, industry agreements 
can be completed by agreements at the company level. These concern nearly 27 % of 
employees in the private sector.
10 The existence of wage differences between regions 
could therefore be explained by these two mechanisms. In the current literature, only the 
study by Plasman et al. (2007) empirically establishes a link between the presence of 
regional wage differentials and company bargaining. However, no study investigates the 
influence of regional sub-joint committees. 
The objective of this contribution is therefore double. First, we want to see if the current 
system of wage formation takes into account regional differences in productivity. To do 
so, we estimate regional wage differentials in each joint committee and we check if these 
differentials are correlated to regional productivity differentials in these joint committees. 
Second, we want to identify the mechanisms that allow for the regional differences in 
 
8 There are differences across sectors.
9 Structure of Earnings Survey, 2003.  
10 Ibidem. 6 
 
productivity to be reflected in wages. For this, we check if the correlation between the 
regional differences in wages and in productivity varies according to the structure of 
collective bargaining. More precisely, we compare decentralised joint committees (i.e. 
joint committees where the percentage of employees covered by a firm agreement is 
relatively high) to centralised joint committees, as well as joint committees subdivided in 
regional sub-joint committees to those that are not.  
The rest of the article is divided into five sections. In the first section, we present the 
dataset used for the estimations. In the second section we check if there exist differences 
in wages between regions. In the third section, we test if these differences in wages are 
explained by differences in productivity. In the fourth section, we question the 
mechanisms that allow for the regional differences in productivity to be reflected in 
wages. Finaly, the fifth section concludes. 
2. Data 
The present study is based upon a unique combination of two large-scale data sets. The 
first, carried out by Statistics Belgium, is the 2003 Structure of Earnings Survey (SES). It 
covers Belgian firms employing at least 10 workers with economic activities within 
sections C to K of the Nace Rev.1 nomenclature. The survey contains a wealth of 
information, provided by the management of the establishments, both on the 
characteristics of the latter (e.g. region, industry, type of financial and economic control, 
size of the establishment) and on their workers (e.g. education, age, seniority, gross 
hourly wages, number of paid working hours, sex, type of employment contract, 
occupation). Therefore, it allows estimating regional wage differentials by taking into 
account compositions effects. Since the SES provides no financial information, it has 
been merged with the 2003 Structure of Business Survey (SBS). This is a firm-level 
survey, also conducted by Statistics Belgium, with a different coverage than the SES in 
that it includes neither the banking sector, nor the electricity sector, nor firms with less 
than 20 employees. The SBS provides firm-level information on value-added per 
employee, which will be used as a proxy for labour productivity. Since the dataset covers 
only firms whose employ salaried workers, the productivity is therefore only that of 7 
 
                                                           
salaried workers and not of self-employed workers. Let us finally note that the results are 
not biased by the phenomenon of the commuters (which is important in Belgium) 
because the data are provided by the companies and thus reflect the productivity of the 
workers at their workplace. 
For the results to be sufficiently representative, we only analyse the joint committees 
which count at least 5 local units
11 in each region in the dataset. Only 25 joint committees 
(out of 83) are in this situation. If one excludes Brussels, the number of joint committees 
with at least 5 local units in both the Flemish and Walloon regions reaches 36. The 
difference comes mainly from joint committees from the manufacturing sector which are 
absent in the Brussels region. Considering that restricting the analysis to joint committees 
present in Brussels would make one miss a lot of information, we compare the regions 
two by two. The analysis is therefore based on 3 different samples that count for 25 joint 
committees for the Brussels–Wallonia comparison, 26 joint committees for the Brussels-
Flanders comparison, and 36 joint committees for the Flanders-Wallonia comparison. 
After having eliminated the heads of companies (ISCO 1) who are not covered by 
collective agreements, and the observations with missing or abnormal values, the three 
analysed sub-samples account for 85.8%, 86.3% and 91.3% of the initial samples 
covering respectively Brussels and Wallonia, Brussels and Flanders, and Flanders and 
Wallonia.  
3. Are there differences in wages between regions? 
Without controlling for differences in characteristics between regions, the mean hourly 
wage
12 in Brussels is 8.2% higher than in Flanders and 11.1% than in Wallonia. The 
mean hourly wage is, in Flanders, 1.8% higher than in Wallonia. These differences in 
 
11 A local unit corresponds to all the establishments of a company situated in the same commune and 
coming from the same sector of activity. 
12 Gross hourly wage includes overtime paid, premiums for shift, night and/or week-end work, and regular 
bonuses. It does not include irregular payments which do not occur during each pay period, such as pay for 
holiday, 13
th month, profit-sharing, etc. 8 
 
                                                           
wages can nonetheless be affected by differences in characteristics between the regions.
13 
In particular, employees in Brussels are on average more qualified than those that work in 
the other regions, which most likely comes from Brussels’ status as a metropolis, capital 
of Belgium and seat of European institutions. Econometric estimations are thus necessary 
to isolate the impact of the regions from the effect of other variables. More precisely, we 
measure the regional wage differentials by estimating wage equations (an equation 
covering the population working in Brussels and in Flanders, an equation covering the 
population working in Wallonia and in Flanders and an equation covering the population 
working in Brussels and Wallonia) which contain controls for factors which intervene in 
the criteria determining the industry agreed wages (occupation, prior experience
14, 
seniority in the company, type of contract, working hours, being working in a team or 
during night or weekend). The occupation variable is nonetheless not very disaggregated 
(9 functions for the workers and 12 for the employers) compared to many classifications 
of occupations in industries or firms. Consequently, it could be that our estimates are 
biased by the fact that the occupations are distributed differently in the three regions. In 
order to reduce this bias, we also control for the joint committee, the industry (NACE 
nomenclature -3 digits-), the gender, the level of education, the form of economic and 
financial control, and the size of the company. Moreover, we control for the fact that the 
employee works overtime. The results of these estimations are presented in the first 
column (model 1) in Table 1. Controlling for differences in characteristics, the 
differences between Flanders and Wallonia increases slightly (reaching 2.4 %) whilst the 
differential between Brussels and Wallonia falls to 2.6% and the differential between 
Brussels and Flanders disappear completely. Most of the wage differential between 
Brussels and the two other regions thus seems to be explained by differences in 
characteristics between regions.
 15  
 
 
13 See table in Appendix 2. 
14 Prior potential experience = age– senority in the company – estimated number of years of schooling – 6. 





Table 1: Regional Wage Differentials, All Joint Committees Taken Together 
  Model 1  Model 2 
Wage differential
a Flanders –  Wallonia  2.4%***  1.9%*** 
 (4.4)  (3.8) 
Wage differential
a Brussels –  Flanders  -0.7%  -0.9% 
 (-0.9)  (-1.2) 
Wage differential
a Brussels –  Wallonia  2.6%***  1.8%** 
 (2.9)  (2.1) 
Productivity in the company
b no yes 
Notes: * p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01; T stats are reported between brackets ; 
a: Regional wage 
differentials based on ordinary least squares estimates of wage equations. Standard errors are corrected for 
heteroscedasticity (White, 1980) and common variance components within groups (Moulton, 1990). The 
control variables of the wage equation are: sex; education (6 dummies); prior potential experience, its 
square and its cube; seniority within the current company and its square; a variable showing whether the 
individual received a bonus for shift work, night work and/or weekend work; a variable indicating whether 
the individual worked overtime; type of contract (2 dummies); a dummy indicating if the worker is part-
time; occupation (20 dummies according to the ISCO classification); size of the establishment (i.e. number 
of workers); financial and economic control (2 dummies); industry (154 dummies according to the NACE 
classification); Joint Committee (35, 25 and 24 dummies respectively for the Flanders-Wallonia sample, the 
Brussels-Flanders sample and the Brussels-Wallonia sample). Gross hourly wage includes overtime paid, 
premiums for shift, night and/or week-end work, and regular bonuses. It does not include irregular 
payments which do not occur during each pay period, such as pay for holiday, 13
th month, profit-sharing, 
etc. 
b: Firm’s annual value added divided by the number of employees in the firm. 
These results can nonetheless hide some disparities between joint committees. In order to 
verify this, we have estimated the wage differentials by joint committee. The choice of 
the joint committee is justified by the fact that this is the predominant level of bargaining 
in Belgium and that it is this level that could potentially be regionalised. Tables 2 to 4 
synthesise the results. The complete denomination of the joint committees is given in the 
appendix. Nearly half of the Walloon workers
16 from the sample work in a joint 
committee where there exists a significant statistical wage differential with Flanders 
                                                            
16  To be correct, they are “workers who are employed in Wallonia”: the data coming from the workplace 
an not the home place. 10 
 
and/or with Brussels (see Table 2 and 3). In the majority of cases, wages are lower in 
Wallonia and the differentials are, on average, a bit more than 8 %. For the 3 joint 
committees where wages are higher in Wallonia (textile, cleaning, and big stores), the 
differentials are weaker and are around 4 %. Concerning the comparison between 
Brussels and Flanders, the proportion of employees who work in a joint committee where 
there exists a significant regional wage difference is smaller (31.2% of Flemish workers 
and 21.9% of workers from Brussels). Again, wages are most often higher in Flanders. 
However, one can see a bigger symmetry in the differentials: they are around 8% both 
when wages are higher in Flanders and in Brussels. It seems therefore that the absence of 
wage differentials between Flanders and Brussels that was obtained for all joint 
committees taken together is due to the fact that the differentials within each joint 
committee compensate each other. One thus sees here the relevance to lead an analysis at 
the joint committee level rather than at the aggregate national level. 
To summarize, it seems that the Belgian system of wage bargaining does not prevent 
having differences in wages between the regions, even if the situation varies according to 
the joint committee and the regions that are compared. 
Table 2: Wage differentials between Flanders and Wallonia by joint committee 
  
Joint Committees 
where wages are 
higher
a in 




where wages are 
lower
a in 









Number of Joint Committees 
(total in the sample = 36)   11 2  13 
In % of employees in Flanders   43.6%  5.6%  49.2% 
In % of employees in Wallonia  41.0%  3.4%  44.4% 
Distribution of the regional 
wage differentials
a:       
  Mean  8.5%  -3.8%   
  Median  8.1%  -3.8%   
  Standard deviation  4.1%  1.3%   
  Minimum  3.5%
b -2.9%
d  
  Maximum  17.2%
c -4.7%
e  
Notes: Regional wage differentials are based on ordinary least squares estimates of wage equation (see 
notes of table 1 for more details); 
a: Differentials statistically significant at the 10% level; 
b: joint committee 
No 218; 
c: joint committee No 201; 
d: joint committee No 121; 
e:  joint committee No 120. 11 
 
Table 3: Wage differentials between Brussels and Wallonia by joint committee 
 
Joint Committees 
where wages are 
higher
a in 




where wages are 
lower
a in 









Number of Joint Committees 
(total in the sample = 25)   8 2 10 
In % of employees in Wallonia   41.8%  4.7%  46.5% 
In % of employees in Brussels  64.5%  5.4%  69.9% 
Distribution of the regional 
wage differentials
a:       
  Mean  8.3%  -4.3%   
  Median  8.1%  -4.3%   
  Standard deviation  3.4%  1.9%   
  Minimum  5.1%
b -3.0%
d  
  Maximum  14.7%
c -5.6%
e  
Notes: Regional wage differentials are based on ordinary least squares estimates of wage equation (see 
notes of table 1 for more details); 
a: Differentials statistically significant at the 10% level; 
b: joint committee 
No 202; 
c: joint committee No 220; 
d: joint committee No 121; 
e:  joint committee No 312. 
 
Table 4: Wage differentials between Brussels and Flanders by joint committee 
  
Joint Committees 
where wages are 
higher
a in 




where wages are 
lower
a in 









Number of Joint Committees 
(total in the sample = 26)   3 8 11 
In % of employees in Flanders   7.0%  24.2%  31.2% 
In % of employees in Brussels  6.9%  15.0%  21.9% 
Distribution of the regional 
wage differentials
a:       
  Mean  7.5%  -7.8%   
  Median  7.8%  -8.1%   
  Standard deviation  1.6%  1.3%   
  Minimum  5.8%
b -5.6%
d  
  Maximum  9.1%
c -9.5%
e  
Notes: Regional wage differentials are based on ordinary least squares estimates of wage equation (see 
notes of table 1 for more details); 
a: Differentials statistically significant at the 10% level; 
b: joint committee 
No 202; 
c: joint committee No 220; 
d: joint committee No 149; 




4. Are the regional wage differentials explained by regional differences in 
productivity? 
To answer this question, we, first, introduce the average firm’s productivity in the wage 
equations in order to see if regional wage differentials vary in comparison to the basic 
specification. The wage differentials estimated via this specification are presented in the 
second row (model 2) in Table 1. The introduction of a firm’s productivity in the wage 
equations makes the wage differentials between Flanders and Wallonia go from 2.4 % to 
1.9 % and the differentials between Brussels and Wallonia go from 2.6% to 1.8%. The 
wage differential between Brussels and Flanders does not change when we control for 
firm’s productivity. In other words, part of the wage differentials between Wallonia and 
the two other regions seems to be explained by differences in productivity between the 
firms situated in the different regions. One still needs to consider these results with 
prudence given the fact that the differences between the differentials of the two models 
are not statistically significant.
17  
This first result in mind, we want to see if the regional differentials in wage and 
productivity for each joint committee are correlated. Using the results from the 3 
samples, the analysis is based on 87 wage differentials and 87 productivity differentials.
18 
Graphic 1 puts in relation the regional wage and productivity differentials within each 
joint committee. Each point on the graphic represents one joint committee. Most of the 
joint committees are represented several times as they are present in more than one 
sample. As the graphic shows, wage and productivity differentials seem to be positively 
correlated. This is confirmed by the coefficient of correlation between the two 




17 In other terms, one cannot exclude the hypothesis in which the differentials of the two models are 
identical.  
18 The methodology for the calculation of wage differentials per joint committee is presented in appendix 4. 
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Regional Productivity Differentials
 
Notes: Regional wage differentials are estimated using the regional dummy variables in the different wage 
equations (estimated by OLS). The per capita firm’s value added serves as proxy to the productivity level.  
 
5. What mechanism allows for regional productivity differentials to be reflected in 
wages? 
In addition to the inter-professional and industry bargaining levels that are national, two 
other levels of bargaining exist in Belgium. First, some joint committees are subdivided 
into regional sub-joint committees. Secondly, industry agreements can be completed 
through bargaining at the company level. The existence of regional wage differentials 
could therefore be explained by these two mechanisms.  
Can bargaining at the company level explain how regional differences in productivity 
lead to regional wage differentials? In order to verify this hypothesis, we compare the 
relation between the regional wage and productivity differentials in the centralised joint 
committees and in the decentralised joint committees. We consider a joint committee to 
13 
 be decentralised if the percentage of wages covered by firm-level collective agreement is 
superior to the median, which is to say 28%. If the hypothesis is correct, the relation 
between productivity differentials and wage differentials should be higher in 
decentralised joint committees, meaning where the level of the company has an important 
weight in determining wages.
17 Our results show that the correlation between the two 
differentials is 0.50 and is significant at 1% for the decentralised joint committees, whilst 
it is only 0.30 and significant to the 5% for the centralised joint committees. Graphics 2 
and 3 illustrate these results.  
Graphic 2: Regional Differential in Wage and Productivity by Joint Committee, 


















































-.5 0 .5 1 1.5
Regional Productiviy Differentials
 
Notes: Regional wage differentials are estimated using the regional dummy variables in the different wage 
equations (estimated by OLS). The per capita firm’s value added serves as proxy to the productivity level.  
                                                            
17 One must be aware that we cannot distinguish if the decentralization concerns wage levels (classification 
of functions and/or determination of regular bonuses), wage increases or both. The information from the 
database indicates only the eventual presence of a company-specific agreement, which could be carried on 




Graphic 3: Regional Differential in Wage and Productivity by Joint Committee 



















































-.5 0 .5 1 1.5
Regional Productivity Differentials
 
Notes: Regional wage differentials are estimated using the regional dummy variables in the different wage 
equations (estimated by OLS). The per capita firm’s value added serves as proxy to the productivity level.  
 
The comparison of the two graphics shows a stronger relation between the wage and 
productivity differentials for decentralised joint committees then for centralised ones, 
where relatively high productivity differentials can be associated to relatively low wage 
differentials. These results seem to validate the hypothesis that the presence of company-
specific agreement may allow wages to adapt to regional productivity differentials. 
Nonetheless, it is possible that the subdivision of joint committees into regional sub-joint 
committees also allows wages to adapt to regional differentials in productivity. Only 3 
joint committees are subdivided into regional sub-joint committees in our sample. This is 





(111), the Joint Committee for white collar workers employed in the manufacture of metal 
products (209) and the Joint Committee of urban and regional transport (328). One should 
note that this subdivision is not necessarily done according to the region. The metallic 
production sector (CP 111.1 and 111.2), for example, is divided into 10 regional 
committees.
19  The correlation between regional wage and productivity differentials for 
these joint committees is 0.76 and is significant at 5%. It seems therefore that the 
subdivision of joint committees into regional sub-joint committees also allows wages to 
adapt to regional differentials in productivity. One must, nonetheless, consider this result 
with prudence since the number of observations used in this calculation is relatively 
low.
20 Considering that these 3 joint committees are classified in the decentralised joint 
committee category
21, one can ask if the results relative to the degree of centralisation are 
not affected by the local subdivision of these joint committees. In order to verify this, we 
calculate the coefficient of correlation for the decentralised joint committees by 
excluding the 3 regional subdivided joint committees. The correlation diminishes very 
slightly from 0.50 to 0.49 and is still significant at 1%, which confirms that company-
specific agreements equally allow for regional productivity differentials to be reflected in 
wage differentials.  
Conclusion 
Within the framework of the debate over the relationship between the structure of wage 
bargaining and economic performances in Europe, the question concerning the regional 
dimension returns in a recurring way. The discussion often relates, in particular, to the 
capacity of wage-setting systems to take into account the important economic disparities 
between regions.  
 
19 Brabant, Flandre occidentale, Flandre orientale, Anvers-Limbourg, Saint-Nicolas, Charleroi-Namur, 
Liège-Luxembourg, Centre, Tournais, et Mons-Borinage.  
20 Considering the fact that these 3 joint committees are presented in the 3 samples, this correlation is based 
on 9 observations.  
21 47%, 38% and 64% of employees are covered by a company-specific agreement respectively for the joint 
committees 111,209 and 328. 17 
 
In Belgium, the regionalisation of wage bargaining is at the heart of current negotiations 
relative to a de-federalisation of employment policy. The partisans for the regionalisation 
of wage bargaining argue that the differences in productivity between regions cannot be 
reflected in a formation of wages at the federal level. They add that a negotiation at the 
Wallonia level would be more sensitive to unemployment and would thus involve lower 
wages for this region.  
In this article we have put forward the fact that an important proportion of Belgian 
employees are covered by joint committees which allow significant regional wage 
differentials. In addition, regional wage differentials and productivity differentials by 
joint committee are strongly correlated. These two results permit to conclude that the 
federal characteristic of the Belgian system of wage bargaining allow wages to adapt to 
differences in regional productivity. It could be argue, however, that this level of 
flexibility is not sufficient, in the sense that it does not remove the regional differences in 
terms of unit labour cost. Our results do not allow us to answer this question. 
Nevertheless our study has highlighted the mechanisms that allow wages to adapt to 
regional productivity. We observe that the correlation between regional wage 
differentials and regional productivity differentials is higher in decentralised joint 
commissions (whereby company-specific agreement has a significant impact on the wage 
setting) and in joint committees subdivided in regional sub-joint committees. Therefore, 
it seems that it is the possibility to negotiate wages at the company level and the existence 
of regional sub-joint committees that allow wages to adapt to the regional productivity 
differentials.   
If wages are not enough sensitive to the local specificities, these two mechanisms could 
be extended. This solution has the advantage of avoiding increasing administrative 
complexities in joint committees where a more important wage differential is not 
necessary. Moreover, the decision to increase the weight of company-specific agreements 
or to subdivide joint committees is taken by the national joint committees, composed of 
those close to the reality on the field. In addition, these mechanisms allow not only taking 
into account differences between regions but equally differences between provinces, 18 
 
labour pools or companies. Lastly, as already pointed by several authors, regionalisation 
of wage bargaining could create a higher increase in wages than in the current national 
system, and could open the path to the regionalisation of the social security. In 
conclusion, the current system already contains the mechanisms that allow for regional 
differences in productivity to be reflected in wages. It is therefore not certain that a 
regionalisation of the wage setting system is necessary.  
Finally, let us note that increasing regional wage differentials will increase wage 
inequalities but the impact on unemployment is unknown Future research should focus at 
the regional level on the impact of an increasing wage dispersion on the employment 
level. Nevertheless, other paths should also be followed in order to increase the level of 
employment, notably investment in education, training and R&D, or reductions of social 
security contributions aimed at low-skilled workers.  19 
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Appendix 1: Description of the Joint Committees analysed 
No of the 
Joint 
Committee 
Name of the Joint Committee 
100  Auxiliary joint committee for blue collar workers 
105  Joint committee for the manufacture of non ferrous metals 
109  Joint Committee for the clothing and apparel industries  
111  Joint Committee for the manufacture of metal, mechanical and electrical products 
112  Joint Committee for garage enterprises  
115  Joint Committee for the glass industry  
116  Joint Committee for the chemical industry  
118  Joint Committee for the food industry  
119  Joint Committee for the trade of food  
120  Joint Committee for the textile and hosiery industries 
121  Joint Committee for the cleaning industry 
124  Joint Committee for the building industry 
126  Joint Committee for the manufacture of furniture and wood products 
129  Joint Committee for the manufacture of pulp and paper 
130  Joint Committee for printing, graphic arts and newspapers  
136  Joint Committee for the manufacture of pulp and paper products 
140  Joint Committee for transport and logistics  
142  Joint Committee for waste reprocessing 
149  Joint Committee of sectors connected the manufacture of metal, mechanical and electrical 
products 
201  Joint Committee for independent retailing   
202  Joint Committee for white collar workers employed in food retailing 
207  Joint Committee for white collar workers employed in the chemical industry 
209  Joint Committee for white collar workers employed in the manufacture of metal products 
210  Joint Committee for white collar workers employed in the steel industry 
211  Joint Committee for white collar workers employed in the oil industry 
214  Joint Committee for white collar workers employed in the textile and hosiery industries 
215  Joint Committee for white collar workers employed in the clothing and apparel industries 
218  National Auxiliary joint committee for white collar workers 
220  Joint Committee for white collar workers employed in the food industry 
221  Joint Committee for white collar workers employed in the paper industry 
222  Joint Committee for white collar workers employed in the manufacture of pulp and paper 
224  Joint Committee for white collar workers employed in the manufacture of non ferrous metals 
226  Joint Committee for white collar workers employed in international trade, transport and 
logistics  
302  Joint Committee of the hotel industry  
307  Joint Committee for brokerage firms and et insurance agencies  
311  Joint Committee of large retail firms  
312  Joint Committee of department stores  
313  Joint Committee for medicine shops 
328  Joint Committee of urban and regional transport  
Source: SPF Emploi, Travail et Concertation sociale. 22 
 
Appendix 2: Means of selected variables 
   Brussels Flanders Wallonia 
Gross hourly wages (EUR)  14.4  13.2  13.0 
Value added-per-worker (EUR)  91 990.9  62 302.0  56 082.6 
Worker’s characteristics          
Female 40.9%  36.0%  33.8% 
Prior experience (years)  11.3  12.2  12.2 
Education:          
   Primary or no degree  5.4% 8.1% 9.6% 
  Lower secondary  22.5% 26.5% 29.2% 
  General upper secondary  20.5% 22.5% 19.3% 
  Technical/Artistic/Prof. upper secondary  14.0% 20.5% 21.3% 
  Higher non university short type, higher artistic training  21.5% 15.7% 13.9% 
  University and non-university higher education, long type  14.9% 6.4%  6.2% 
  Post-graduate  0.4% 0.2% 0.3% 
Job’s characteristics          
Seniority in the company (years)  7.8  7.8  8.5 
Part-time 16.0%  17.2%  15.1% 
Working in Shift, or During Night or Weekend  8.5%  12.9%  16.9% 
Working overtime  2.7%  2.5%  2.6% 
Type of contract:          
  Unlimited-term employment contract  94.9% 96.2% 94.6% 
  Limited-term employment contract  4.8% 3.3% 4.5% 
  Other employment contract  0.4% 0.4% 0.8% 
Occupation (ISCO 1 digit):          
    Professionals 23.1%  11.0%  10.0% 
    Technicians and associate professionals 12.0%  9.7%  10.2% 
    Clerks  26.4%  19.8%  19.1% 
    Service workers and shop and market sales workers  13.0%  10.0%  9.8% 
    Craft and related trade workers  10.6%  20.2%  24.3% 
    Plant and machine operators and assemblers  7.6%  19.6%  15.5% 
    Elementary occupations  7.4%  9.7%  11.1% 
Firm’s characteristics          
Size of the establishment (number of employees)  299.9  304.4  180.2 
Form of Economic and Financial control:          
    100% private  94.2%  97.6%  96.2% 
    Partly State owned  0.1%  0.8%  0.4% 
    Other  5.7%  1.6%  3.4% 
Industry (NACE 1 digit):          23 
 
    Mining and quarrying  0.0%  0.0%  0.1% 
    Manufacturing 15.8%  38.3%  36.7% 
    Construction  5.6%  8.9%  11.3% 
    Wholesale and retail trade; Repair of motor vehicles,   
motorcycles and personal and household goods  28.9%  21.0%  23.5% 
    Hotels and restaurants  6.8%  3.1%  3.0% 
    Transport, storage and communication  10.7%  10.1%  9.3% 
    Financial intermediation  2.2%  0.4%  0.5% 
    Real estate, renting and business activities  29.9%  18.3%  15.7% 
Note : means computed with sample weights 24 
 
Appendix 3: Wage Equations for different samples 
  Brussels + Flanders 
sample
a
Brussels + Wallonia 
sample
b
Flanders + Wallonia 
sample
c
Region of the establishment     
-0.009 0.017**  n.a.  Brussels 
(0.007) (0.009)   
Reference n.a. 0.019***  Flanders 
   (0.005) 
n.a. Reference  Reference  Wallonia 
   
Worker’s characteristics     
-0.108*** -0.075*** -0.121***  Female 
(0.005) (0.006) (0.004) 
Prior experience:       
0.018*** 0.020*** 0.016***      Simple 
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
-0.055*** -0.064*** -0.046***      Squared/10² 
(0.006) (0.009) (0.005) 
0.057*** 0.074*** 0.050***      Cubed/10
4
(0.010) (0.013) (0.009) 
Education:      
    Primary or no degree  Reference 
0.021*** 0.006 0.024***      Lower secondary 
(0.007) (0.010) (0.006) 
0.067*** 0.048*** 0.067***      General upper secondary 
(0.008) (0.012) (0.007) 
0.076*** 0.077*** 0.072***      Technical/Artistic/Prof. upper 
secondary  (0.008) (0.011) (0.007) 
0.145*** 0.148*** 0.132***      Higher non university short 
type, higher artistic training  (0.010) (0.014) (0.009) 
0.276*** 0.278*** 0.276***      University and non-university 
higher education, long type  (0.012) (0.018) (0.012) 
0.524*** 0.480*** 0.491***      Post-graduate 
(0.053) (0.041) (0.048) 
Job’s characteristics     
Seniority in the company:       
0.017*** 0.018*** 0.016***      Simple 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
    Squared/10²  -0.021***  -0.022***  -0.020*** 25 
 
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) 
0.047*** 0.067*** 0.043*** 
Working in Shift, or During 
Night or Weekend  (0.007) (0.009) (0.006) 
0.032*** 0.037*** 0.018**  Working overtime 
(0.009) (0.012) (0.008) 
-0.003 -0.006 -0.002  Part time 
(0.005) (0.007) (0.005) 
Type of contract:     
    Unlimited-term employment 
contract 
Reference 
-0.042*** -0.058*** -0.032***      Limited-term employment 
contract  (0.012) (0.014) (0.009) 
-0.014 -0.036* -0.024      Other employment contract 
(0.017) (0.019) (0.016) 
Firm’s characteristics     
0.087*** 0.071*** 0.099***  Value added-per-worker (ln) 
(0.008) (0.012) (0.007) 
0.012*** 0.005 0.017***  Size of the establishment
e (ln) 
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) 
Form of economic and financial 
control: 
   
    100% Private  Reference 
-0.031 -0.081* -0.018      Partly State owned 
(0.040) (0.043) (0.040) 
0.002 -0.019 0.011      Other 
(0.018) (0.027) (0.018) 
R²   0.58  0.60  0.56 
F stat  5 346.7***  10 703.0***  72.5*** 
Number of observations  49 708  26 445  58 427 
Notes : * p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01; T stats are reported between brackets ; Standard errors are 
corrected for heteroscedasticity (White, 1980) and common variance components within groups (Moulton, 
1990). 
a: covers the joint committees No 100, 111, 112, 116, 118, 119, 121, 124, 126, 130, 136, 140, 149, 
201, 202, 207, 209, 211, 218, 220, 226, 302, 311, 312, 313 and 328; 
b: idem except No 211; 
c: idem plus No 
105, 109, 115, 120, 129, 142, 214, 215, 222, 224 and 307; 
d: age minus seniority in the company minus 
estimated number of years of schooling minus 6;  
e: Number of employees; The wage equation also 
contains controls for the occupation (20 dummies according to the ISCO classification); the industry (154 
dummies according to the NACE classification) and the joint committee (35, 25 and 24 dummies 
respectively for the Flanders-Wallonia sample, the Brussels-Flanders sample and the Brussels-Wallonia 
sample). Gross hourly wage includes overtime paid, premiums for shift, night and/or week-end work, and 
regular bonuses. It does not include irregular payments which do not occur during each pay period, such as 
pay for holiday, 13
th month, profit-sharing, etc. Appendix 4: Methodology used to estimate the regional wage differentials by joint 
committee: 
In the first stage, we estimate the following wage equation by ordinary least squares, 
correcting standard errors for heteroscedasticity (White, 1980) and for common variance 
components within groups (Moulton,1990):  







i k k i j i j i j j i i X JC gion JC gion w , , , ) * (Re Re θ δ γ β α    (1) 
where w is the logarithm of the gross hourly wages of October 2003, which includes 
overtime paid, premiums for shift, night and/or week-end work, and regular bonuses and 
does not include irregular payments which do not occur during each pay period, such as 
pay for holiday, 13
th month, profit-sharing, etc ; Region is a dummy variable equal to 1 if 
the individual works in Brussels and 0 if he works in Wallonia when using the sample 
covering Brussels and Wallonia, 1 if the individual works in Brussels and 0 if he works in 
Flanders when using the sample covering Brussels and Flanders, and 1 if the worker 
works in Flanders and 0 if he works in Wallonia when using the sample covering 
Flanders and Wallonia; JCj are dummy variables indicating to which joint committee the 
individual belongs. For the sample covering Brussels and Wallonia, they are joint 
committees number 100, 111, 112, 116, 118, 119, 121, 124, 126, 130, 136, 140, 149, 201, 
202, 207, 209, 211, 218, 220, 226, 302, 311, 312, 313 et 328. For the sample covering 
Brussels and Flanders, this is the same except the joint committee 211. For the sample 
covering Flanders and Wallonia, there is also the joint committees number 105, 109, 115, 
120, 129, 142, 214, 215, 222, 224, et 307 ; Finally Xk  are the control variables, namely 
sex; education (6 dummies); prior potential experience, its square and its cube; tenure 
within the current company and its square; a variable showing whether the individual 
received a bonus for shift work, night work and/or weekend work; a variable indicating 
whether the individual worked overtime; type of contract (2 dummies); a dummy 
indicating if the worker is part-time; occupation (20 dummies according to the ISCO 
classification); size of the establishment (i.e. number of workers); financial and economic 
control (2 dummies); industry (154 dummies according to the NACE classification);  




δ β            ( 2 )  
As an illustration, we estimate the wage differential between Flanders and Wallonia for 
the joint committee No 201, hence using the sample covering Flanders and Wallonia.  
The mean logarithm of the gross hourly wages of individuals working in Flanders and 
belonging to the joint committee No 201 is given by:  
∑ + + + + =
K
k
i k k i X JC Flanders w E , 201 201 201) & | ( θ δ γ β α      (3) 
The mean logarithm of the gross hourly wages of individuals working in Wallonia and 
belonging to the joint committee No 201 is given by:  
∑ + + =
K
k
i k k i X JC Wallonia w E , 201 201) & | ( θ γ α       ( 4 )  
The difference in logarithm of gross hourly wages between Flanders and Wallonia in the 
joint committee No 201 is given by the difference between equation 3 and equation 4:  
201 201 201 ) & | ( ) & | ( δ β + = − JC Wallonia w E JC Flanders w E i i     (5) 
Finally, the wage differential (in %) is given by : 
1
201 −
+δ β e            ( 6 )  
All the regional wage differentials by joint committees are presented in the appendix 5. 





Appendix 5: Regional wage differentials, Regional productivity differentials, and 
















100 Brussels-Flanders  -0.09  -0.07  0.08 
100 Brussels-Wallonia  -0.05  -0.27  0.08 
100 Flanders-Wallonia  0.11  -0.22  0.08 
105 Flanders-Wallonia  -0.01  0.29  0.83 
109 Flanders-Wallonia  -0.02  0.84  0.02 
111 Brussels-Flanders  -0.06  -0.08  0.47 
111 Brussels-Wallonia  -0.03  0.02  0.47 
111 Flanders-Wallonia  0.01  0.11  0.47 
112 Brussels-Flanders  -0.02  0.17  0.05 
112 Brussels-Wallonia  0.05  0.66  0.05 
112 Flanders-Wallonia  0.05  0.42  0.05 
115 Flanders-Wallonia  -0.06  -0.09  0.67 
116 Brussels-Flanders  -0.07  -0.27  0.68 
116 Brussels-Wallonia  0.05  -0.19  0.68 
116 Flanders-Wallonia  0.08  0.10  0.68 
118 Brussels-Flanders  0.00  0.25  0.36 
118 Brussels-Wallonia  0.05  0.21  0.36 
118 Flanders-Wallonia  0.03  -0.03  0.36 
119 Brussels-Flanders  0.08  -0.20  0.20 
119 Brussels-Wallonia  0.03  0.03  0.20 
119 Flanders-Wallonia  -0.03  0.28  0.20 
120 Flanders-Wallonia  -0.05  -0.06  0.13 
121 Brussels-Flanders  -0.02  0.12  0.22 
121 Brussels-Wallonia  -0.03  -0.09  0.22 
121 Flanders-Wallonia  -0.03  -0.18  0.22 
124 Brussels-Flanders  -0.02  0.07  0.00 
124 Brussels-Wallonia  0.00  0.19  0.00 29 
 
124 Flanders-Wallonia  0.01  0.11  0.00 
126 Brussels-Flanders  -0.01  -0.38  0.15 
126 Brussels-Wallonia  -0.01  -0.29  0.15 
126 Flanders-Wallonia  -0.01  0.15  0.15 
129 Flanders-Wallonia  -0.06  -0.39  1.00 
130 Brussels-Flanders  0.04  0.04  0.23 
130 Brussels-Wallonia  -0.08  -0.01  0.23 
130 Flanders-Wallonia  -0.12  -0.05  0.23 
136 Brussels-Flanders  -0.03  -0.17  0.61 
136 Brussels-Wallonia  0.10  -0.16  0.61 
136 Flanders-Wallonia  0.12  0.01  0.61 
140 Brussels-Flanders  -0.08  -0.32  0.14 
140 Brussels-Wallonia  -0.02  -0.28  0.14 
140 Flanders-Wallonia  0.07  0.06  0.14 
142 Flandre-Wallonie  -0.07  -0.05  0.03 
149 Brussels-Flanders  -0.06  -0.09  0.04 
149 Brussels-Wallonia  -0.02  0.12  0.04 
149 Flanders-Wallonia  0.05  0.23  0.04 
201 Brussels-Flanders  -0.09  -0.27  0.01 
201 Brussels-Wallonia  0.01  0.04  0.01 
201 Flanders-Wallonia  0.17  0.43  0.01 
202 Brussels-Flanders  0.06  0.01  0.25 
202 Brussels-Wallonia  0.05  0.07  0.25 
202 Flanders-Wallonia  -0.01  0.06  0.25 
207 Brussels-Flanders  0.02  -0.13  0.45 
207 Brussels-Wallonia  0.10  0.00  0.45 
207 Flanders-Wallonia  0.04  0.15  0.45 
209 Brussels-Flanders  -0.03  -0.01  0.38 
209 Brussels-Wallonia  0.02  0.15  0.38 
209 Flanders-Wallonia  0.02  0.16  0.38 
211 Brussels-Flanders  0.02  -0.35  0.05 
214 Flanders-Wallonia  0.02  0.19  0.06 
215 Flanders-Wallonia  0.04  0.08  0.06 218 Brussels-Flanders  0.01  1.04  0.10 
218 Brussels-Wallonia  0.05  1.16  0.10 
218  Flanders-Wallonia  0.03 0.06  0.10 
220 Brussels-Flanders  0.09  0.46  0.31 
220 Brussels-Wallonia  0.15  0.78  0.31 
220 Flanders-Wallonia  0.05  0.22  0.31 
222 Flanders-Wallonia  0.08  0.01  0.20 
224 Flanders-Wallonia  -0.03  0.16  0.82 
226 Brussels-Flanders  0.06  0.40  0.35 
226 Brussels-Wallonia  0.07  0.77  0.35 
226 Flanders-Wallonia  0.03  0.27  0.35 
302 Brussels-Flanders  0.00  0.09  0.00 
302 Brussels-Wallonia  -0.04  0.13  0.00 
302 Flanders-Wallonia  -0.02  0.04  0.00 
307 Flanders-Wallonia  0.00  0.36  0.35 
311 Brussels-Flanders  -0.08  -0.04  0.55 
311 Brussels-Wallonia  -0.01  -0.02  0.55 
311 Flanders-Wallonia  0.02  0.02  0.55 
312 Brussels-Flanders  -0.08  0.13  0.69 
312 Brussels-Wallonia  -0.06  0.01  0.69 
312 Flanders-Wallonia  0.02  -0.11  0.69 
313 Brussels-Flanders  -0.08  0.00  0.57 
313 Brussels-Wallonia  0.05  0.33  0.57 
313 Flanders-Wallonia  0.12  0.34  0.57 
328 Brussels-Flanders  -0.04  0.10  0.64 
328 Brussels-Wallonia  0.09  0.20  0.64 
328 Flanders-Wallonia  0.08  0.10  0.64 
a: Computed on the basis on the wage equations estimates (cf. appendix 4) ; 
b Differential between the mean 
value added-per-worker in region 1 and in region 2, within the same joint committee. 
c: All regions taken 
together.  
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